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The ‘Economics of Attention’:  
A History of Economic Thought Perspective 
Agnès Festré and Pierre Garrouste* 
 
This article takes stock of the increasing interest that the economic profes-
sion has shown for the role of attention in our economies this last decade. 
It also highlights that the concept of attention is an old issue in social sci-
ences and that it has been central for those economists of the past most in-
terested in the relation between the functioning of the brain beyond mere 
economic rationality and economic decisions. This exercise provides then 
the opportunity to investigate today’s literature on the economics of atten-
tion in comparative as well as critical terms. Finally, the article attempts to 
look ahead in the context of the rising influence of behavioural economics 
and address issues at stake in order to capture all the dimensions of hu-
man attention and their implications for the understanding and analysis 
of economic phenomena. 
Keywords: economics of attention, rationality, economic psychology, cog-
nitive economics 
«  L’économie de l’attention  » :  
une perspective d’histoire de la pensée économique 
Cet article s’intéresse à la littérature économique portant sur la notion 
d’attention qui s’est développée ces dernières années. Il retient une per-
spective d’histoire de la pensée en retraçant l’origine de cette notion 
depuis la philosophie en passant par la psychologie cognitive et la théorie 
économique d’auteurs qui ont poussé la réflexion à propos de la rational-
ité et de la prise de décision au-delà des frontières usuelles de la discipline 
économique. Cet exercice présente l’intérêt d’appréhender la littérature 
émergente sous un angle à la fois comparatif et critique. Finalement, 
l’article tente de proposer des pistes de réflexion et d’approfondissement 
de la littérature existante sur la notion d’attention à la lumière des dé-
veloppements dans le domaine de l’économie comportementale.  
Mots-clés : économie de l'attention, rationalité, psychologie économique, 
économie cognitive 
JEL: B00, B4, D00 
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1. State of the Art 
The “economics of attention” increasingly gained importance in aca-
demic research since the first appearance of the term in 1997 in a sem-
inal on-line article by Michael Goldhaber where he defined it as a 
sub-field of the “Internet economics”, focusing on the time-
consuming dimension of overflowing information. The rising activity 
of bloggers or the intense use of social networks (Facebook, Twitter, 
etc.) in the last decade is a clear indication of the fact that attention 
(rather than information or knowledge) has become a critical econom-
ic resource for decision-making. Quite some economists have ad-
dressed the problem of limited attention and its economic conse-
quences. As anticipated by Camerer (2003), it has become one of the 
most important topics of behavioural economics1. Applied to macroe-
conomic policy, this problem is coined as rational inattention2 and has 
been put forward by central bankers as one of the lessons to be drawn 
from the 2008 financial crisis (Trichet, 20103) and by some economists 
(Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 2000; Sims, 2003; Shiller, 1997) as an al-
ternative to the assumption of rational expectations for inflation fore-
casts notably. In the field of financial theory, Hirschleifer and Teoh 
(2003) analyze the implications of investors’ limited attention for 
firms’ information policy and financial market equilibrium.  
The notion of attention is however an old concept in social scienc-
es. Originally a philosophical, then a psychological notion, it became 
popularized in economics thanks to Herbert Simon, whose work on 
information and cybernetics in the 50s focused on the interference 
between information and cognitive capacities.  
                                                            
1 “Another interesting psychological concept, neglected in behavioral economics 
until recently, is limited attention. Attention is the ultimate scarce cognitive re-
source. It is possible to learn to attend to many stimuli at the same time—as busy 
financial-market floor traders and cell-phone-using drivers do—but long-term 
memory suffers. Scarce attention might be useful for explaining economic phe-
nomena like organizational structure (division of labor expands organizational 
attention but is constrained by the need to coordinate) and advertising (which 
‘grabs’ attention).” (Camerer, 2003, 16) 
2 Rational inattention deals with the issue of which parts of macroeconomic data 
should rational agents evaluate if limited-processing capacity forces them to dis-
card part of the data. 
3The following statement by Trichet in his opening address dedicated to “Les-
sons from the crisis for macroeconomics and finance theory” at the ECB Central 
Banking Conference held in Frankfurt in November 2010 is exemplary: “When 
the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and financial models 
immediately became apparent…we may need to consider a richer characteriza-
tion of expectation formation. Rational expectations theory has brought macroe-
conomic analysis a long way over the past four decades. But there is a clear need 
to reexamine this assumption. Very encouraging work is under way on new con-
cepts, such as learning and rational inattention.” (Trichet, 2010) 
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The endeavor of this article is to look at the concept of attention 
from a history of economic thought perspective in order to evaluate 
the so-called ‘attention economics’ current literature.  
The paper will be organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reminds 
the reader of the philosophical and psychological roots of the notion 
of attention. 
Section 3 endeavors to trace back the process of diffusion of the 
concept of attention in economics from a history of economic thought 
perspective. 
Section 4 attempts to provide a critical account of the current liter-
ature in ‘attention economics’ and suggests the range of questions still 
to be addressed by scholars in the area.  
2. The Notion of Attention in Old and New Psychology 
The notion of attention was originally discussed by philosophers and 
closely linked to theories of knowledge. Among the issues considered 
was the role of attention on conscious awareness and thought, re-
ferred to as apperception, defined as the process of understanding 
something or new ideas perceived in terms of previous experience or 
pre-existing ideas4. For instance, Leibniz (1704) suggested, using the 
metaphor of one’s loss of awareness of the constant sound of a water-
fall that events could cease to be apperceived (i.e. represented in con-
sciousness) without specific attention. He therefore claimed that at-
tention determines both what is and what is not apperceived (that is, 
represented in consciousness). Incidentally, we may also refer to Ad-
am Smith, who in his History of Astronomy (1775), referred to a notion, 
which he labels ‘wonder’ (or the effect of novelty as he states himself) 
and which is very much related to the concept of attention as later 
defined by psychologists5. According to him, ‘wonder’ plays a major 
role in the process of discovery by scientists to the extent that it per-
                                                            
4 For a history of the notion of attention in philosophy, see Théodule Ribot (1889) 
and the introduction of Ribot (2007) by Serge Nicolas. Among the mentioned 
forerunners in philosophy that have been interested in the notion of apperception 
are Aristotle (300 B.C. [1984]), Malebranche (1675), Leibniz (1704), Condillac 
(1754) and Bonnet (1760). 
5 Smith also referred to the notion of ‘surprise’, which he distinguished from 
‘wonder’: “We wonder at all extraordinary and uncommon objects, at all the rarer 
phenomena of nature, at meteors, comets, eclipses, at singular plants and ani-
mals, and at everything, in short, with which we have before been either little or 
not at all acquainted; and we still wonder, though forewarned of what we are to 
see.” By contrast, “we are surprised at those things which we have seen often, but 
which we least of all expected to meet with in the place where we find them; we 
are surprised at the sudden appearance of a friend, whom we have seen a thou-
sand times, but whom we did not imagine we were to see then.” (Smith, [1795] 
1975, 44) 
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mits to bring together distinct current and forgone events so as to 
make sense and form a consistent whole6. 
The term of apperception was still employed when psychology be-
came a young autonomous science in the 18th century7 and even after. 
For instance, Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), one of the founders of ex-
perimental psychology (through the development of psychophysical 
methods), uses the term in order to describe different concentric fields 
of awareness from general (Blickfeld) to focal (Blickpunkt) features of 
human awareness (Wundt, 1893, vol. 2., 267). More precisely, he dis-
tinguished between perception, which was the entry into the field of 
attention, and apperception, which was responsible for entry in the 
inner focus (Blickpunkt) and assumed that the focus of attention could 
narrow or widen. At the end of the 19th century, Hermann von Helm-
holz (1821-1894) also contributed to the development of the experi-
mental perspective on attention, with emphasis on the role of ‘covert 
attention’ for visual perception (Helmholz, 1910). In particular, using 
himself as a subject and pages of briefly visible printed letters, he an-
ticipated some later work in the 50s showing that attention could be 
directed in advance of the stimulus presentation to a particular region 
of the page, even though the eyes were kept fixed at a central point. 
Moreover, he found that attention was limited: some letters in the 
visual field, even in the vicinity of the fixation point, were not auto-
matically perceived. 
Undoubtedly one of the most well-known works on attention in 
psychology is William James’s Principles of Psychology (1890), where 
attention is defined as “…the taking possession by the mind, in clear 
and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously pos-
sible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of con-
sciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things 
in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition which has a 
real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state.” (James, 
1890, 403-404) 
In James’ time, the method more commonly used to study atten-
tion was introspection, except for isolate attempts to measure atten-
                                                            
6 As Smith wrote: “Their [the scientists’] imagination, which accompanies with 
ease and delight the regular process of nature, is stopped and embarrassed by 
those seeming incoherencies; they excite their wonder, and seem to require some 
chain of intermediate events, which, by connecting them with something that has 
gone before, may thus render the whole course of the universe consistent and of a 
piece. Wonder, therefore, and not any expectation of advantage from its discover-
ies, is the first principle which prompts mankind to the study of Philosophy.” 
(Smith, [1775] 1975, 26) 
7 For a history of attention in psychology, see Hatfield (1995, 1998), Titchener 
(1908) and Neumann (1971). Hatfield (1995) claims that the notion of attention 
has been introduced in psychology in 1730s by Wolff (1738).  
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tion8, and one of the major debates of this period was whether it was 
possible to split attention (i.e., to attend to two things at a time) or to 
attend to something in a state of distraction. 
At the beginning of the XXth century, while methods to measure 
attention, which could have helped to resolve the debate, were devel-
oping, the study of attention as a mental process became marginal-
ized by the rise of behaviourism and positivism9. Behaviourism’s 
principal advocate, John Watson (1878-1958), was interested primarily 
in stimulus-response relations, and therefore, confined attention to an 
operational concept defined in terms of discriminative response to 
external stimuli10.  
Interest in attention revived during the cognitive revolution of the 
1940s, when engineers and applied psychologists became involved in 
problems of man-machine interaction in various applied contexts. 
The research originated from concern about the performance of radar 
operators during the World War 2 and cognitive psychology was 
mainly concerned with human information processing. It also draws 
on Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication11 (Shannon, 
1940). 
                                                            
8 The empirical works in order to measure attention are due to Wolff (1738), 
Bonnet (1760) and Donders (1864), a Dutch ophthalmologist who was a precursor 
in using mental chronometry. Mental chronometry is studied using the meas-
urements of reaction time (RT). Reaction time is the elapsed time between the 
presentation of a sensory stimulus and the subsequent behavioral response. In 
psychometric psychology it is considered to be an index of speed of processing. 
9 This point is controversial. Lovie (1983), who compiled tables showing the 
numbers of papers on attention listed in Psychological Abstracts and its prede-
cessors, Psychological Index, in five-year intervals from 1910 to 1960, showed that 
numerous studies on attention were conducted during this time periods: for in-
stance, Jersild (1927) on the ability to shift attention or Telford (1931) on the psy-
chological refractory period (PRP) effect. Moreover, Stroop published in 1935 
what is certainly one of the most widely cited studies in the field of psychology, 
in which he demonstrated that stimulus information that is irrelevant to the task 
can have a major impact on performance (Stroop, 1935). This research has given 
rise to the famous Stroop Color-Word Task, widely used in psychology. In this 
cognitive task, participants are asked to name the color of the ink in which an 
incompatible color word is printed. This test evidences that, e.g., it takes longer to 
say “red” aloud in response to the stimulus GREEN printed in red ink than to say 
“red” to the stimulus XXXXX printed in red ink.  
10 Note that previous experiments by the Russian physiologists Pavlov and 
Bekhterev on dogs and animals showed that the conditioned responses to stimuli 
included measureable signs of attention such as pricked-up ears, head turned 
towards the stimulus, increased muscular tension, etc. 
11 A central notion of this theory is ‘Shannon capacity’, which is a measure of 
information flow rate that is inherently probabilistic. It uses the reduction in the 
entropy (which is a global measure of uncertainty) of a probability distribution as 
the measure of information flow. 
 8 Agnès Festré and Pierre Garrouste | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 5(1) : 3-36 
During this period, Cherry (1953) conducted one of the seminal 
works on the problem of selective attention12 also known as “the cock-
tail party phenomenon,13” as he himself called it. He used a proce-
dure called dichotic listening in which he presented different messag-
es to ear through headphones. This experiment showed that when 
subjects are told to listen to two streams of words in different ears, 
they selectively attend to one stream. Broadbent (1952) built on Cher-
ry’s experiments and developed the first complete model of selective 
attention called Filter Theory (Broadbent, 1958). This model assumes 
that information selection occurs at a very early stage with no guaran-
tee that the selected information is relevant to the task14. Anne Treis-
man (1960), who is one of the most influential cognitive psychologist15 
reformulated it into a more flexible version called the Filter-
                                                            
12 Selective attention is often loosely defined. A few definitions from the literature 
are: “The differential processing of simultaneous sources of information” (John-
son and Dark, 1986, 44); “A system of cognitive processes that manages the bur-
den of having too much to do at once by prioritizing among stimuli to be pro-
cessed” (Carr, 2004, 56); and “the generic term for those mechanisms which lead 
our experience to be dominated by one thing rather than another” (Driver, 2001, 
53). Nowadays, one point of agreement is that selective attention is a broad con-
cept covering many distinct mechanisms operating in a variety of brain systems, 
if not the entire system rather than one specific function or mechanism as some 
scientists maintained. For instance, Posner (2004) localized this function in the 
“attentional organ system”, LaBerge (1997) in the “triangular circuit” and 
McKnight (2007) in the synchronization of activity between prefrontal, parietal 
and mediotemporal cortex. 
13 The Cocktail Party Effect illustrates the ability to focus our listening on a single 
talker among a mixture of conversations and background noises, and to pay at-
tention to a stimulus that grabs our attention suddenly, such as our names. 
14 Broadbent (1952) conducted an experiment of dichotic listening in which par-
ticipants were instructed to answer a series of Yes-No questions about a visual 
display over a radio-telephone. For example, the participants would be asked “S-
1 from G.D.O. Is there a heart on Position 1? Over”, to which the participants 
should answer “G.D.O. from S-1. Yes, over.” The participants were assigned to 
five different groups and their ability to answer one of two messages delivered at 
the same time (but one of which was irrelevant) was tested under varying con-
texts that manipulate information given by the instructor (through visual or audi-
tory cues) concerning which of the two voices is to be answered. In the first four 
groups, participants heard two successive series of messages, in which two voices 
(G.D.O. and Turret) spoke simultaneously during some of the messages. In the 
fifth group, they heard two new recordings that permit to make simultaneous 
messages more distinct than for the other groups in addition to the recordings of 
group I, II, III and IV. Results indicate that visual cue to the correct voice is use-
less, thus suggesting that process of discarding part of the information contained 
in the mixed voices has already taken place. 
15 Anne Treisman did her PhD in Oxford, when she met and marry three years 
later Michel Treisman, another Oxford graduate student. She remarried in 1978 to 
Daniel Kahneman. Shortly after, they accepted positions at the University of Brit-
ish Columbia, Canada. 
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Attenuation Theory. The working hypothesis of this theory is that 
processing of unattended information is attenuated or reduced, rather 
than completely filtered out, accounting for the fact that unattended 
information sometimes reaches consciousness.  
In brief, the development of information-processing cognitive psy-
chology during this period was first punctuated by debates as to 
whether the selection filter operated before or after cognitive pro-
cessing (early vs. late selection models of attention16).  
But modern psychology also evolved along two main paths that 
gave rise to the differentiation between filter and executive attention 
theories17. 
Executive attention18 theories can be best defined by referring to 
Kahneman’s (1973) famous model of attention. They emerged in the 
early 70s when a shift in the study of attention occurred: from exper-
iments mainly based on auditory tasks towards experiments involv-
                                                            
16 Broadbent (1958) and Treisman (1969) concluded in favor of early selection 
models, showing that attention shuts down or attenuates processing in the unat-
tended ear before the mind can analyze its semantic content. At the opposite, 
Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) supported the late selection view by showing that 
the content in both ears is analyzed semantically, even if the words in the unat-
tended ear cannot access consciousness. Results like that of MacKay (1973) posed 
problems for filters theories, by showing that even unconscious stimuli could be 
processed to a high degree. For a survey on the early literature on attention in 
psychology, see Kahneman and Treisman (1984). 
17 Pashler (1998) summarizes the empirical evidence obtained in attention psy-
chology and asserts that capacity limits and perceptual gating both characterize 
human perceptual processing (Pashler, 1998, 224). According to this author, 
many controversies in psychology research result from the fact that some re-
searchers identify the concept of attention with the allocation of a limited pro-
cessing capacity to a given set of items, while others relate attention to the selec-
tion of this set by a gating mechanism. The gating mechanism implies that mental 
resources are allocated only to those items that have passed the perceptual filter, 
while the rest is ignored. 
Wickens (1980) refers to Kahneman’s model as an approach focusing on the ‘en-
ergetic’ side of attention as compared to filter theories that focus on its ‘selective’ 
side. As summarized by Ruz, “whereas selection theories aimed at localizing the 
point in the processing chain (from perception to motor responses) at which irrel-
evant stimuli were filtered out (i.e., the location of the ‘bottleneck’), energetic 
views investigated how resources were divided among tasks or the unitary or 
multiple nature of this ‘attentional energy’.” (Ruz, 2006, 499) 
18 The notion of executive attention is even more loosely defined that the one of 
selective attention. It was defined by Posner and Rothbart (1998) as “the regula-
tion of thought, emotion and behavior” (Posner and Rothbart, 1998, 1915). Nor-
man and Shallice included planning, conflict resolution, decision-making, error 
correction, and overcoming habitual responses to perform novel or difficult tasks 
as executive processes (Norman and Shallice, 1986, 2-3). Nowadays, the consen-
sus seems to be that executive attention involves centralized supervisory control, 
which requires two important functions 1) information about and 2) causal influ-
ence over the things supervised and controlled.  
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ing visual tasks. Contrary to filter theories that focused on selective 
attention, Kahneman’s model was based on the idea that there is one 
central resource capacity for attention (based in the frontal cortex) for 
which all activities requiring attention compete19. Research on atten-
tion blossomed during the last quarter of the 20th century and many 
studies emanating from multiple source models corroborated the as-
sumption that it is easier to perform two tasks together when the 
tasks use different stimulus or response modalities than when they 
use the same modalities. Treisman and Gelade (1980) published a 
seminal paper in which the very influential Feature Integration Theo-
ry was propounded. This theory extended the Spotlight theory of vis-
ual attention20, which assumed that it was possible to change the fo-
cus . 
Attention is now viewed by some psychologists as functioning as 
networks connecting distributed areas of the brain, although these 
“networks support not only the general functions of attention com-
mon to all people, but also the individual differences that relate to 
aspects of temperament and intelligences.” (Posner and Rothbart, 
2007, 18) 
In a nutshell, in recent years, there has been extensive research 
aimed at supporting the production of mental taxonomy, with con-
verging evidence coming from different domains (psychology, psy-
chophysiology, cognitive sciences, psychophysics, and so on). More-
over, the idea of selective attention is now studied from different per-
spectives in the social sciences21.  
                                                            
19 In passing, it is to be noted that this model derives from Kahneman’s dual-task 
system based on the differentiation between endogenous (voluntary) and exoge-
nous (involuntary/automatic) control. In Kahneman’s (1973) words, voluntary 
attention means that the subject’s attention is driven towards because they are 
relevant to a task that he has chosen to perform (Kahneman, 1973, 4), whereas 
“involuntary attention is related to level of arousal, which is largely controlled by 
the properties of the stimuli to which an organism is exposed” (ibid., 3). Kahne-
man’s model of executive attention has been criticized on the ground that it in-
volves a “homunculus problem”: to wit, “a little man inside the brain” (Allport, 
1980, 113) who directs attention. For Stinson (2009), this homunculus problem is 
attached to all theories of attention where executive attention is thought of as a 
cause rather than an effect. Moreover, Stinson argues that neither empirical evi-
dences in neurosciences nor computational models purporting to support causal 
executive theories of attention can set down the issue in a satisfactory way. 
20 Spotlight theory of visual attention (Posner et al., 1980) assumed that subjects 
are able to shift their spotlight of attention from location to location, independent-
ly and prior to eye position, and adjust the size of the attended region like a zoom 
length. However, the theory assumed that the attentional spotlight cannot divide 
across multiple locations. 
21 A an example, eye tracking is used to analyze the way individuals read and 
then learn to read (see for example, Just and Carpenter, 1980; Baccino and Ma-
nunta, 2005) but also the effects of advertising (Pieters, Rosenberg and Wedel, 
1999; Pieters, Wedel and Zhang, 2009) and more generally the relations between 
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Let us know investigate how the notion of attention penetrated the 
field of economics. Robert Lanham22 (2006), who attempts to trace the 
intellectual roots of what he calls the “economics of attention,” refers 
to Simon but also to Gregory Bateson and Friedrich Hayek as fore-
runners. For the sake of conciseness and homogeneity, we shall put 
aside the contribution of Gregory Bateson, which, albeit very interest-
ing23, cannot be directly linked to the development of today’s eco-
nomics. Besides, we will pay special attention to the contribution of 
Michael Polanyi, whose epistemological stance at the nature of 
knowledge is valuable for current economic analysis. 
3. The Diffusion of the Notion of Attention in Economics: 
A History of Economic Thought Perspective 
The notion of attention penetrated the realm of economics and organ-
izational sciences through various authors who can be characterized 
by a strong interest in multidisciplinary approaches and in particular, 
psychology, organization science as well as epistemology and philos-
ophy of science. 
3.1. Herbert Simon 
Regarding the topic of attention, Herbert Simon24 first observed the 
simple but fundamental connection between information and atten-
tion: 
                                                                                                                                     
eye movements and individuals’ behavior: see, e.g. Arieli et al. (2011) who use 
eye tracking techniques in order to investigate how people choose between two 
lotteries. 
22 Robert Lanham is Professor emeritus of English literature at UCLA. His book 
The Economics of Attention is about the move from an economic system based on 
things and objects to an economics of attention where the central commodity is 
not stuff but style, i.e., what he labels fluff, for style is what competes for our at-
tention amid the din and deluge of new media in order for us to make sense of 
overflowing information.  
23 In particular, in Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972), Gregory Bateson insisted on 
the scarcity of conscious attention, an economy he labelled ‘systemic awareness’, 
and focused on the cognitive and emotional aspects of ecological knowledge. The 
notion of ecological knowledge is related to the idea that socio-cultural and eco-
logical relationships link any learning object with its context matter. Because rela-
tionships transform both the knower and the known, individual minds may be 
disconnected from each other and from nature.  
24 Herbert A. Simon, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978 for 
his pioneering research into the decision-making process within economic organ-
izations, was an American economist and psychologist (with a Ph.D. in political 
science from the University of Chicago in 1942) whose research ranged across the 
fields of cognitive psychology, computer science, public administration, econom-
ics, management, philosophy of science and sociology. He was the Richard King 
Mellon Professor of Computer Science and Psychology at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
 12 Agnès Festré and Pierre Garrouste | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 5(1) : 3-36 
What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of 
its consumers. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of atten-
tion and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabun-
dance of information sources that might consume it. (Simon, 1971, 40) 
Retrospectively, Simon’s contribution regarding attention may be 
characterized by a dual emphasis on cognition (limited attention ca-
pacity) and structure (how organization shapes individual’s atten-
tion).  
In his early work on administrative behaviour (1947), he empha-
sized that the well-known ‘bounded rationality’ assumption hinges 
on the limited attentional capability of humans and serves as a justifi-
cation for the existence of organizations and institutions as means of 
orienting attention. As Simon wrote, “organizations and institutions 
provide the general stimuli and attention-directors that channelize 
the behaviors of the members of the group, and that provide the 
members with the intermediate objectives that stimulate action” (Si-
mon, 1947, 100-101).  
Later in The Science of the Artificial (1969) he emphasized the role 
played by visual memory, pointing out both its limits and its organi-
zation. Borrowing from the work of the Dutch A. de Groot on chess, 
he explained that visual memory is related to the attention that chess 
players put on some emerging features of the arrangement of the 
pieces on the chess board that have been printed in their brain as a 
result of abstraction from previous play and experience. It is what 
Simon names intuition conceived as a process of subconscious pattern 
recognition25:  
Evidence about the nature of the storage of ‘visual’ images, pointing in the 
same direction as the example I have just given, is provided by the well-
known experiments of A. de Groot [in the 40s] and others on chess percep-
tion [see De Groot 1966]. De Groot put chess positions – taken from actual 
games – before subjects for, say five seconds; then he removed the posi-
tions and asked the subjects to reconstruct them. Chess grandmasters and 
masters could reconstruct the positions (with perhaps 20 to 24 pieces on 
the board) almost without error, while duffers were able to locate hardly 
                                                                                                                                     
versity in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he taught for 52 years. Simon was 
among the founding fathers of artificial Intelligence, information processing, de-
cision-making, problem-solving, attention economics, organization theory, com-
plex systems, and computer simulation of scientific discovery. He was the first to 
analyze the architecture of complexity (Simon, 1962). As well as receiving the 
highest honor possible in economics, he was the recipient of the American Psy-
chological Association’s Award for Outstanding Lifetime Contributions to Psy-
chology in 1993, and the prestigious A. M. Turing Award for his work in com-
puter science (1975). 
25 “The process is subconscious pattern recognition based on experiences stored 
in memory and retrieved when necessary. While short term memory can store 
only small amount of information, long term memory is, metaphorically speak-
ing, a large encyclopedia with an elaborated index in which information is cross-
referenced.” (Frantz, 2003, 270) 
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any of the pieces correctly and the performance of players of intermediate 
skill fell somewhat between masters and duffers. But the remarkable fact 
was that, when masters and grandmasters where shown other chess 
boards with the same numbers of pieces arranged at random, their abilities 
to reconstruct the boards were only marginally better than the duffers’ 
with the boards from actual games, while the duffers performed as well or 
poorly as they had before. (Simon, [1969] 1996, 71-72) 
In other terms, previous experiments serve as a selection device that 
facilitates problem solving by focusing attention on a few characteris-
tics only. Newell and Simon’s symbolic framework (1973) is based on 
the idea that information processing is about the manipulation of rep-
resentations. For Simon, information processing psychology permits 
to explain what people really do when they have to take difficult de-
cisions and solve complex problems:  
Information processing theories envisage problem solving as involving 
very selective search through problem spaces that are often immense. Se-
lectivity, based on rules of thumb or ‘heuristics’, tends to guide the search 
into promising regions, so that solutions will generally be found after 
search of only a tiny part of the total space. Satisficing criteria terminate 
search when satisfactory problem solutions have been found. (Simon, 
1978, 362)  
Therefore, problem solving is all about design and abstraction and 
requires mechanisms that permit to hierarchize and select from a vast 
array of information. The role of the near-decomposability of a prob-
lem into sub-problems is a mean that facilitates problem-solving, that 
is, the search of solutions26. This has to be linked with Simon’s idea 
that social sciences have to borrow methods and tools that natural 
sciences have developed. It is the reason why he conceived the hu-
man problem-solving process as similar to computer/software pro-
gramming27. 
Those mechanisms are assimilated to pre-stored schemata or prior 
knowledge based on previous experience that attract our attention 
and permit to economize on trial-and-error search. As Simon wrote: 
We see this particularly clearly when the problem to be solved is similar to 
one that has been solved before. Then, by simply trying again the paths 
                                                            
26 “Recently the near-decomposability hypothesis has been renamed ‘modularity 
hypothesis’ and is pervading diverse disciplines, ranging from software design 
(where the object-oriented programming paradigm is nothing but a prescription 
of highly modular system) to management science (where largely the same prin-
ciple are applied to the organization of firms and manufacturing systems).” 
(Egidi and Marengo, 2004, 342-343). Fodor (1983) is an attempt to apply the mod-
ularity hypothesis to cognitive sciences. 
27 “I have argued that an epistemology for computers is possible because com-
puters do think.” (Simon, 1989, 19) 
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that led to the earlier solution, or their analogues, trial-and-error search is 
greatly reduced or altogether eliminated. (Simon [1969], 1996, 196-197)28 
As we know, Simon’s influence first penetrated the field of organiza-
tion theory, where the concept of attention has a long history and tra-
dition. Different authors have stressed different aspects of attention 
allocation and structuring, but not in a unified perspective. In particu-
lar, they have emphasized either attention as shaped by routines and 
bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963), 
or alternatively, as loosely coupled through enactment processes29 
(Weick, 1979) and organized anarchy30 (Cohen, March and Olsen, 
1972). 
More recently, there have been some developments in managerial 
sciences that borrow from Simon’s look at attentional problems in 
organizations. For instance Ocasio (1997) laments the lack of interest 
of scholars to study “the effects of the social structure on the channel-
ling and distribution of decision-makers” (Ocasio, 1997, 188). He in-
stead tries to develop an explanation for firm behaviour based on the 
structuring of organizational attention. Organization attention pro-
cessing and regulation is shown to be the result of three principles: (1) 
At the level of individual cognition, the principle of focus of attention 
links attentional processing to individual cognition and behaviour; (2) 
at the level of social cognition, the principle of situated attention high-
lights the importance of the situational context in explaining what 
decision-makers attend to; (3) at the organizational level, the principle 
of structural distribution of attention explains how the firm’s econom-
ic and social structures regulate and channel issues, answers, and de-
cision-makers into the activities, communications, and procedures 
that constitute the situational context of decision-making. 
                                                            
28 Interestingly the ideas of memory and similarity are at the basis of the Cased-
Based Decision Theory (CBDT) developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995). 
“CBDT has some common features with the notion of ‘satisficing’ decisions of 
Simon (1957) and March and Simon (1958), and may be viewed as formalizing 
this idea.” (612). 
29 Weick describes the term enactment as representing the notion that when peo-
ple act they bring structures and events into existence and set them in action. 
Weick uses this term in the context of ‘sensemaking’ by managers or employees. 
He also describes how they can enact ‘limitations’ upon the system to avoid is-
sues or experiences. It is also seen as a form of social construction. To date enact-
ment is related to organizations and their environment and strategic manage-
ment. 
30 Organized anarchies are associated with the so-called “garbage can model” of 
decision making. They correspond to organizations, such as universities, which 
fail to adhere to the conditions of more classical models of decision making in 
some or all of three important ways: preferences are problematic, technology is 
unclear, or participation is “fluid”, i.e., it involves formal and informal groups at 
all levels, all interacting at various levels of the organization, all increasing vari-
ous levels of complexity. 
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Rerup (2010) extends Ocasio’s framework by focusing not only on 
top-down senior management processes in directing attention but 
also on their synchronization with bottom-up processes, which are 
ignored by Ocasio’s approach. According to Rerup, “an attention de-
lay denotes the time it takes to make a non-salient issue salient to top 
management.” His approach consists in combining “theories of or-
ganizational attention and coordination to propose that attention de-
lays can be mitigated when organizations develop designs that gen-
erate ‘synchronized prospective attention’, through which an organi-
zation’s different hierarchical levels proactively and iteratively con-
sider the future impact that non-salient issues might have.” (Rerup, 
2010, 4) This “synchronized prospective attention” is of prime im-
portance when non-salient but potentially very damaging threats are 
involved in organizations. These situations are characteristic of the 
health care sector (Madsen et al. 2006), of military or intelligence ac-
tivities (Baker and Hulse, 2009), or of air traffic control, were organi-
zations need to swiftly allocate attention to emerging issues. 
To sum up, one of the major contributions of Simon is to have 
stressed the dual – cognitive (individual) and structural (organiza-
tional) –aspect of human decision-making. This led him to consider 
attention, conceived as a device highly related to abstraction and 
simplification in the context of overabundance of information, as a 
key device in problem solving. He also explored the overwhelming 
theoretical and empirical implications of the interplay between cogni-
tion and structure in a vast array of fields such as information pro-
cessing, organizational design or scientific research in general. As will 
be developed next, Friedrich Hayek was also deeply interested in the 
attentional aspects of human cognition, though from a different per-
spective. 
3.2. Friedrich Hayek  
Friedrich Hayek can also be considered as a major forerunner of the 
economics of attention. His interest for the role of attention is highly 
related to his conception of knowledge, as developed in The Sensory 
Order (1952), a contribution to theoretical cognitive psychology he 
wrote in the 20s but only published in the 50s31. Hayek contempora-
                                                            
31 The curious context in which Hayek developed his ideas is worth to be re-
minded. In the winter of 1919-1920 a fuel shortage and forced closure of the Uni-
versity of Vienna presented Hayek with an opportunity to spend a few weeks in 
Zurich working in the laboratory of the brain anatomist Constantin von Mona-
kow, tracing fiber bundles of the brain (cf. Hayek, 1994, 63-64). A few months 
later, Hayek wrote the initial working material for The Sensory Order, a student 
paper manuscript entitled “Beiträge zur Theorie der Entwicklung des Bewusst-
seins”. As emphasized by Caldwell (2004), Hayek’s endeavor was to challenge 
the dominant doctrine in psychology known as the “doctrine of psycho-
physiological parallelism” endorsed by Ernst Mach and few others in Vienna. 
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neously described The Sensory Order as “the most important thing I 
have ever done.” (letter to John Nef, dated 6 November 1948, cited 
from Caldwell, 1997, 1856) Unfortunately, as noted by Butos and 
Koppl (2007), despite the recognition Hayek’s cognitive theory has 
received from outside economics by scholars such as Gerald Edel-
man32, Joaquin Fuster and Edward Boring, its influence for research-
ers in economics and the social sciences must be described at best 
tangential (Butos and Koppl, 2007, 35). 
Hayek’s innovative idea at the core of The Sensory Order is that 
mind functions as a classification system which permits to connect, 
though not in a one-to-one mapping, the order of physical stimuli or 
objects with the order of mental states or categories. This process of 
classification involves what Hayek will later refer in his 1978 paper 
“The Primacy of the Abstract” as “specification by superimposition” 
(Hayek, 1978, 48). In The Sensory Order, he used the analogy of a topo-
logical ‘map’ and explains how different vertically sub-systems of 
neural connexions form a pyramid of partial maps operating at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction or generality33:  
Every sub-system of this kind will constitute a partial map of the envi-
ronment, and the maps formed at the lower levels will serve for the guid-
ance of merely a limited range of responses, and at the same time act as fil-
ters or preselectors for the impulses sent on the higher centers, for which 
in turn, the maps of the lower levels constitute a part of the environment. 
(Hayek, 1952, 111) 
                                                                                                                                     
Hayek is indeed very skeptical of the existence of one-to-one correspondence 
between an external stimulus and the experience of a sensation (Caldwell, 2004, 
140). Hayek’s interest in the role of knowledge in economics is also illustrated by 
two famous articles: “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) and “The use of infor-
mation in society” (1945). 
32 Gerald Edelman who won the Nobel Prize in Physiology in 1972 confesses that 
he has been inspired by some of Hayek’s ideas on neuronal selection: “I must say 
that I have been deeply gratified by reading a book [Hayek’s The Sensory Order] of 
which I had not been aware when I wrote my little essay on group selection theo-
ry…I was deeply impressed…I recommend this book to your attention [i.e. The 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences], as an exercise in profound thinking by 
a man who simply considers knowledge for its own sake. What impressed me 
most is his understanding that the key to the problem of perception is to compre-
hend the nature of classification. Taxonomists have struggled with this problem 
many times, but I think Hayek considered this problem in a broader sense.” 
(Gerald Edelman, “Through a Computer Darkly: Group Selection and Higher 
Brain Function”, Bulletin — The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 
XXXVI, No. 1, Oct. 1982, 24). Other scientists outside economics have praised 
Hayek’s contribution. According to Steele (2002), Hayek’s Sensory Order also fore-
shadows Henry Potkin’s evolutionary epistemology. 
33 “As the classification becomes…more ‘general’ and less ‘specific’, the classify-
ing event also becomes more and more definitely a central process while the rela-
tions to any particular peripheral response become at the same time more remote 
and round-about.” (Hayek, 1952, 113). 
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This semi-permanent structure provides an apparatus for classifica-
tion and orientation of the impulses from neuron to neuron, which 
derives from past experience and exists “independently of the partic-
ular impulses proceeding in it at a given moment” (Hayek, 1952, 115). 
The map is partly innate, partly related to previous experience, which 
implies that it has a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the neural 
impulses. Moreover, it is specific to each individual. What Hayek re-
fers to as “the model” by contrast is made by “the flow of impulses 
which at any moment trace a further pattern which will have signifi-
cance only by its position in that structural framework [the map, add-
ed by us] within which it moves” (Hayek, 1952, 116) and with regard 
to the “attitudes”, “sets” or “dispositions” that follow from certain 
“emotions”, “needs” or “drives” (Hayek, 1952, 96-97). The combina-
tion of the map and the model determines behaviour and action: “It is 
only through the superimposition of many classifications and disposi-
tions that a particular action is specified.” (Hayek, 1978, 40) 
A logical consequence of this conception of the mind is that it en-
tails some fundamental limitations of knowledge: “We shall never be 
able to achieve more than an explanation of the principle, on which 
mind operates, and shall never succeed in fully explaining any par-
ticular mental act.” (Hayek, 1952, 35) This is so because sensory per-
ception must be viewed as an act of classification that abstracts from 
the physical world and “always precede[s] the more abstract mental 
contents.” (Hayek, 1952, 137) As Hayek stated it: “What we perceive 
are never unique properties which the objects have in common with 
other objects. Perception is thus always an interpretation, the placing 
of something into one or several classes of objects.” (Hayek, 1952, 
xviii)34  
From this it results that consciousness is nothing else in natura that 
a classification system which distinctive feature is that it is “associat-
ed with the highest degree of generality of classification or evalua-
tion.” (Hayek, 1952, 137) Moreover, it is impossible to define it 
properly or to have a precise recognition of the mental facts it entails, 
due to the limits of knowledge the classification systems inherently 
entails. This is why Hayek thinks that, in order to discriminate be-
tween consciousness and unconsciousness, it is more useful to con-
centrate on what consciousness does rather than on what conscious-
ness is (ibid., 133). Hayek explains that one of the criteria of con-
sciousness is its unity, i.e., a close connexion between all conscious 
events (ibid., 136), while unconsciousness which occurs at different 
strata of decreasing abstraction is characterized by its diversity. The 
                                                            
34 This quotation can be paralleled with Edelman’s one: “A closed universal de-
scription of objects is not available to an adaptive creature, even to one with con-
cepts; there is no “voice in the burning bush” telling that animals what the world 
description should be.” (Edelman, 1989, 32) 
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unity of consciousness means that consciousness deals with a com-
mon space-time framework, which is only the emerged part of the 
iceberg, apparently separate from the foundations, i.e., the different 
levels of neural connexions that gave rise to it: “Conscious experienc-
es have in this respect justly been compared to mountain tops rising 
above the clouds which, while alone visible, yet presuppose an invis-
ible substructure determining their position relative to each other.” 
(ibid., 33)35 
Now, it is interesting to emphasize how Hayek distinguishes at-
tention from consciousness. At first sight, and judging by his refer-
ence to Boring’s view that “consciousness is attentive, attention is se-
lective, consciousness is selective” (Boring, 1933, 231-232; quoted by 
Hayek, 1952, 139), Hayek seems to conceive attention as almost syn-
onymous to consciousness. But on the other hand, he made clear that 
attention slightly differs from consciousness for being concerned 
mainly with events that are in some sense expected or anticipated: It 
is a “characteristic of attention that it has these effects” of greater dis-
crimination “only with regards to events which are in some sense ex-
pected or anticipated”: Attention “is thus always directed, or con-
fined to a particular class of events for which we are on the look-out 
and which, in consequence, we perceive with greater distinctness 
when one of them occurs.” (Hayek, 1952, 139) 
From this perspective, attention is most correctly described by its 
anticipatory character or by being a “state of excitatory prepared-
ness”, which is not confined to the conscious level (ibid., 140). For in-
stance, hypnotic practices can illustrate this feature of attention (in 
this case, involuntary attention) occurring at remote level of uncon-
sciousness.  
Another characteristic of attention is provided by its complemen-
tarity with abstractness: perception based on abstraction, namely on 
general or generic attributes, of the perceived objects may be supple-
mented by “directing our attention to more specific or particular fea-
tures” (ibid., 145). Therefore it is as if attention permitted to highlight 
some of the patterns involved in the model directing behavior and 
therefore made us more aware of the mental events resulting from 
them. Attention is therefore a special instance of the more general 
category that Hayek labels “the model”, which is linked to the “dis-
positions” or the “sets” of individuals (Hayek, 1952, 140).  
                                                            
35 In passing, this is one of the reasons why Hayek has some difficulty to deal 
with intentionality and has recourse to the idea of spontaneous order, being the 
result of human action and not of human design. But this argument should be 
qualified by taking into account the plasticity and mutability of the classification 
structure of the brain. The cognitive process, according to Hayek, despite being 
constrained by tacit rules and its own physiology, has “the capacity for self-
conscious and reflective activity” since it is an “active, input-transforming 
knowledge generating adaptive system.” (Butos and Koppl, 2006, 39) 
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Moreover, and interestingly enough for the diffusion of 
knowledge and inter-individual coordination, this individual apti-
tude to focus on special events and trace back the process of abstrac-
tion that gave rise to them “also provides the condition for the indi-
vidual to participate in a social or conventional representation of the 
world which he shares with his fellows.” (Hayek, 1952, 142)  
This leads us to endorse the view that The Sensory Order is of great 
interest not only as a piece of theoretical psychology per se but also 
because it captures Hayek’s conception of knowledge. The latter, in 
turn, is essential in order to reach a synthetic view of his overall con-
tribution, and in particular to understand how he characterized mar-
ket mechanisms36. As emphasized by Butos and Koppl (2006) and 
contrary to other commentators of Hayek who endorse the disconti-
nuity thesis37, the Sensory Order perspective can be applied, not only 
to the problem of (discovery and use) of knowledge – as it often re-
duced to – but also to the understanding and “analysis of different 
social arrangements and structures” which produce orders that are 
“not simply aggregations of agents and their capacities” but involve 
“a transformation of knowledge into a unique kind of social 
knowledge that could not have been otherwise produced.” (Butos 
and Koppl, 2006, 40) 
Contrary to many interpretations, neither the idea of division of 
knowledge among individuals (i.e., the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and space), nor the distinction between theoret-
ical knowledge and the knowledge of the particular circumstances of 
time and space (Hayek, 1945, 521) are sufficient to explain why Hayek 
                                                            
36 In this perspective, it is interesting to note that Simon praised Hayek for his 
way to characterize market mechanisms: “No one has characterized market 
mechanisms better than Friedrich Hayek.” (Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, 
2nd Edition, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981, 41). The idea of an analogy be-
tween the brain and the organization of markets has been a source of inspiration 
for many researchers in social sciences, and has valuable implications for eco-
nomic analysis even if, in economics, the interest for cognition and psychology 
has experiences several setbacks. 
37 Early interpretations (see Machlup, 1974 or Runde, 1988) view The Sensory 
Order as ancillary to the rest Hayek’s work on philosophy, politics, and econom-
ics. More recent interpretations (see Birner, 1999 or Vanberg, 2004) consider Hay-
ek’s writings on cognitive psychology mostly as a methodological contribution 
disconnected from his economics. This is surprising, judging from the central role 
played by perceptions and expectations in Hayek’s business cycle theory. As 
Birner puts it: “Contrary to what might expect, however, none of the mental 
mechanisms of his earlier theory on perception and cognition play a part in his 
economics.” (Birner, 1999, 43). At the opposite, Caldwell (2004) or Butos and 
Koppl (2006) seem to consider that The Sensory Order is foundation work in Hay-
ek’s economics. D’Amico and Boettke (2010) endorse a more qualified view, by 
inversing the causality: “It is Hayek’s vision of the working economy that is the 
key to understand his theoretical psychology” and not the other way around 
(D’Amico and Boettke, 2010, 360). 
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considers that socialist planning is not an efficient coordination 
mechanism. As rightly pointed out by Butos and McQuade (2002), “it 
is strictly incorrect to say that the market gathers up ‘divided’ indi-
vidual knowledge and makes the information available to many oth-
ers…Instead, the market takes, as input knowledge in the initial 
sense…and classifies this, producing a totally different kind of 
knowledge.” (Butos and McQuade, 2002, 128) As Hayek claims: 
“Knowledge which any individual mind consciously manipulates is 
only a small part of the knowledge which at any one time contributes 
to the success of his action.” (Hayek, 1960, 24) 
In retrospect, Hayek’s concern for the economics of attention is 
conceptually-related to his conception of the nature of knowledge. 
This lead him to consider attention as a way to circumvent the limits 
of knowledge due to its fragmented nature (1) by permitting a higher 
degree of awareness on the causality between peculiar circumstances 
and the specific outcome they give rise to in a context of excitatory 
preparedness and (2) by providing the conditions for individuals to 
communicate between each other since they are conscious to share 
the same cognitive structures in particular abstracting abilities.  
As will be developed in the next sub-section, Michael Polanyi also 
focused on the limits of knowledge in many of his writings. It is 
therefore quite natural to consider him as another forerunner of the 
economics of attention. 
3.3. Michael Polanyi 
Michael Polanyi was an eclectic scientist (from medicine to research 
in physical chemistry, economics, social and political analysis) but 
also a philosopher with strong interests in theology and aesthetics. He 
was the brother of the well-known economist Karl Polanyi and the 
father of John Polanyi who won the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1986. 
As Hayek, Michael Polanyi focused on the tacit dimension of 
knowledge and related it to the concept of integration. For Polanyi, 
tacit knowledge is a key component of all kind of knowledge, scien-
tific, artistic or religious. He emphasizes that “all knowledge is either 
tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. A wholly explicit knowledge is un-
thinkable” (Polanyi, 1966a, 7). This is the main reason why he con-
stantly insisted on the fundamental indeterminacy of science: “Scien-
tific discovery cannot be achieved by explicit inference, nor can its 
true claims be explicitly stated. Discovery must be arrived at by the 
tacit powers of the mind and its content, so far as it is indeterminate, 
can be only tacitly known.” (Polanyi, 1966, 1) The intellectual roots of 
Michael Polanyi’s thought can be traced back to both Gestalt psychol-
ogy38 and Piaget’s theory of intellectual development. Accordingly, 
                                                            
38 Gestalt psychology is a theory of mind and brain, which considers that the brain 
is holistic, parallel and analog, with self-organizing tendencies. This suggests that 
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tacit knowledge is conceived as the result of a process of integration 
or “tacit inference” (Polanyi, 1966a) that involves two kinds of cogni-
tive systems: one which he describes as the “proximal term of tacit 
knowing” and the other, described as the “distal term of tacit know-
ing”:  
[The] act of integration, which we can identify both in the visual percep-
tion of objects and in the discovery of scientific theory, is the tacit power 
we have been looking for. I shall call it tacit knowing. It will facilitate my 
discussion of tacit knowing if I speak of the clues or parts that are subsidi-
arily known as the proximal term of tacit knowing and of that which is fo-
cally known as the distal term of tacit knowing.” (Polanyi, 1966a, 73)39  
What is original in Polanyi is that he uses seeing as a paradigm for 
knowing. A basic element in Polanyi’s account of tacit knowledge is 
indeed the distinction between two kinds of awareness (subsidiary 
vs. focal awareness), inspired from stereoscopic pictures40, which ex-
emplify this dual process of cognition. Focal awareness is the ordinary 
kind of full awareness we have in focusing attention on a specifiable 
object. Subsidiary awareness, in contrast, refers to the more remote pe-
ripheral noticing of the features of an object that are not attended to in 
themselves but seen as pointers or clues to the object of focal atten-
tion. Polanyi also refers to subsidiary awareness as from-awareness 
since he says that we attend from subsidiary particulars to an entity 
under scrutiny, and calls the relation between the particulars and the 
whole entity the “from to relation” (Polanyi, 1966a, 146). 
In a nutshell, the two kinds of awareness are linked by a logical re-
lation (the relation between clues and the image to which the clues 
are pointing), which is similar to the relation between body and 
mind41 and explain both the roots and the dynamic features of our 
personal knowledge: “The tracing of personal knowledge to its roots 
in the subsidiary awareness of our body as merged in our focal 
                                                                                                                                     
the human beings see objects in their entirety before perceiving their component 
parts. 
39 In The Body-Mind Relation, Polanyi writes: “When I point my finger at a wall 
and call out: ‘Look at this!’ all eyes turn to wall, away from my finger. You are 
clearly attending to my pointing finger, but only in order to look at something; 
namely the point to which my finger is directing your attention.” (Polanyi, 1968, 
85) The finger is the proximal term although the wall is the distal one. 
40 Stereoscopy refers to the techniques used by 3D imaging for creating or en-
hancing the illusion of depth in an image by means of stereopsis for binocular 
vision. Most stereoscopic methods present two offset images separately to the left 
and right eye of the viewer (a metaphor for subsidiary awareness). These two-
dimensional are then combined in the brain to give the perception of 3D depth (a 
metaphor for focal awareness). 
41 “The purpose of this paper is to show that the relation between body and mind has the 
same logical structure as the relation between clues and the image to which the clues are 
pointing. I suggest that the body is a subsidiary thing which bears on the mind 
which is its meaning.” (Polanyi, 1968, 90; italics in the original) 
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awareness of external objects, reveal not only the logical structure of 
our personal knowledge but also its dynamic sources.” (Polanyi, 1962, 
60) 
Moreover, focal and subsidiary awareness are mutually exclusive 
relative to sense making. As Polanyi states it in Personal Knowledge, 
“…in our from-awareness of a thing we see it as having a meaning, a 
meaning which is wiped out when we focus our attention [focal 
awareness] on the thing of which we have only had a from-
awareness.” (Polanyi, 1975, 39) In other terms, the specificity of from-
awareness is that it is sense making, whereas the functional character-
istic of focal awareness lies in it being sense depriving. But for Po-
lanyi, attention is sense depriving not due to cognitive limitations. We 
may be able to specify all the items or subsidiary clues that are enter-
ing into an integrated meaning. But when focal attention is directed 
on a subsidiary clue, “it turns into a different thing deprived of the 
meaning it had while serving as a subsidiary” (Polanyi, 1975, 39).  
For this reason subsidiary clues are “essentially unspecifiable”: “We 
must distinguish…between two types of unspecifiability of subsidiar-
ies. One type is due to the difficulty of tracing the subsidiaries – a 
condition that is widespread but not universal; the other type is due 
to a sense deprivation which is logically necessary and in principle 
absolute.” (ibid., 39) 
In other words, Polanyi distinguishes between two kinds of irre-
versibility and shows why the process of tacit inference is not sym-
metrical. The first one, i.e., contingent irreversibility, is due to our 
likely impossibility to identify all the clues we have integrated. The 
second one, i.e., logical irreversibility, on the other hand, always 
holds, and refers to the fact that when we go back to the subsidiaries 
we loose their joint meaning. This means that “a process of logical dis-
integration has reduced a comprehensive entity to its entirely meaningless 
fragments.” (Polanyi, 1965, 800) This is the reason why, for Polanyi, 
“the process of formalizing all knowledge to the exclusion of tacit 
knowledge is self-defeating.” (Polanyi, [1966b], 2009, 20) and may 
have subversive implications since it may destroy the subject matter 
itself. 
Finally, the distinction between focal awareness and subsidiary 
awareness is not reducible to the distinction between consciousness 
and unconsciousness. For Polanyi, focal awareness is always fully 
conscious, while subsidiary awareness “can exist at any level of con-
sciousness, ranging from the subliminal to the fully conscious”. Po-
lanyi adds: “What makes awareness subsidiary is its functional char-
acter…” (Polanyi, 1975, 39)  
To sum up, Polanyi’s account of attention is also related to the 
problem of knowledge but more focused on the process of tacit infer-
ence, which logically goes from subsidiary to focal awareness, and its 
properties (sense depriving, not symmetrical, involving different lev-
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els of consciousness). Polanyi also warns us against the opportunity 
cost of attention, i.e., its non-reversible sense depriving character. 
4. The Economics of Attention Today: Taking Stock and 
Looking Ahead 
In this last section, we put the nowadays literature on the so-called 
‘economics of attention’ in perspective with the insights of the previ-
ous section. The main objective of this exercise is to suggest new di-
rections of research that still need to be developed. Two of the fore-
runners of economics of attention, Hayek and Polanyi do not inspire 
recent literature dealing with attention. As for Hayek (see below) his 
conception of information and knowledge seems to be the main ex-
planation of this lack of descent. Polanyi’s case is due, first to his ec-
lecticism and, second to the fact that his conception of ‘awareness’ has 
been underrated as compared with his notion of ‘tacit knowledge’ 
that has been highly popularized by the economics of innovation and 
economics of knowledge as well. 
Very briefly there are two different approaches in economics that 
deal with attention economies.  
According to the first approach, attention economics is considered 
as a ramification of information economics, which derives from 
Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication (Shannon, 1948). 
From this perspective, attention is conceived, in compliance with the 
principles of the mathematical theory of communication (Shannon, 
1948), as a function of the unlikelihood of an event to happen and of 
the frequency of similar past events (which provides a measure of the 
surprise value or the degree of novelty). Consequently, an event that 
has never been experienced before is supposed to have a high sur-
prise value and therefore to attract attention, even if it lacks any spe-
cific associations or consequences. This seems however at odds with 
the diffused idea in cognitive psychology that attention depends on 
both the unexpectedness of events and of their familiar association. 
This drawback, together with the recognition of the incalculable effect 
of past experience on the information carried by any binary digit ul-
timately led them to abandon information theory42. 
If cognitive psychology abandoned this direction, the information-
economics approach instead adopted it. As well-known, this ap-
proach assumes full rationality and considers sub-optimalities caused 
by asymmetric information and information overload. Key empirical 
issues relate to information pollution and its solutions (technological 
tools, market-based mechanisms, or institutional arrangements and 
regulatory devices).  
                                                            
42 See for example Garrouste (2001). 
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Note that there is an alternative strand of formal approach to in-
formation, which builds on Aumann’s seminal “Agreeing to disa-
gree” theorem. This algebraic approach has become prominent in the 
economic literature and has given rise to recent developments dedi-
cated to awareness43.  
But there is a second approach of economics of attention, which 
focuses on expectations and predictions and considers that cognitive 
limits of attention constitute behavioral foundations of bounded ra-
tionality.  
Not surprisingly, the first approach of the literature on the eco-
nomics of attention, as exemplified by Shapiro and Varian 1999’s 
Handbook Economics of Information and Networks considers attention 
as a scarce economic resource and discusses its empirical conse-
quences for information users. More precisely, the literature analyses 
the various business strategies (price or product discrimination in the 
presence of network externalities, switching costs, product sharing, 
etc.) to particularize information in order to catch users’ attention and 
increase their utility by providing them with more relevant infor-
mation. But usually attention scarcity has an asymmetric impact on 
information users and providers. This explains that an important part 
of the literature is concerned with the problem of spamming. This 
problem is a typical case of externality or information pollution in a 
context of asymmetric information between the e-mail sender, who 
knows the contents of the message, and the receiver, who does not. It 
is a case of externality or information pollution the sender of the mes-
sage imposes to the receiver. Three main solutions have been pro-
posed, the technological, the institutional and the market-based one44. 
From our history of economic thought perspective, it is very interest-
ing to note that Hotelling as soon as 1938 warned against the harmful 
effect of excess demand for attention on behalf of media and advertis-
ing businesses, as the following quotation strikingly exemplifies: 
Another thing of limited quantity for which the demand exceeds the sup-
ply is the attention of people. Attention is desired for a variety of commer-
cial, political, and other purposes, and is obtained with the help of bill-
boards, newspaper, radio, and other advertising. Expropriation of the at-
tention of the general public and its commercial sale and exploitation con-
stitute a lucrative business. From some aspects this business appears to be 
of a similar character to that of the medieval robber barons, and therefore 
to be an appropriate subject for prohibition by a state democratically con-
trolled by those from whom their attention is stolen. But attention attract-
ing of some kinds and in some degree is bound to persist; and where it 
                                                            
43 For the sake of brevity, we shall not review this literature. Cf. the website at 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unaw.htm for a bibliography. 
44 See Kraut et al. (2002 2005), Van Alstyne, Loder, and Wash (2004), Zandt (2001) 
and Loder, Van Alstyne and Wash (2004) for a comparison of these alternative 
solutions.  
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does, it may appropriately be taxed as a utilization of a limited resource. 
Taxation of advertising on this basis would be in addition to any taxation 
imposed for the purpose of diminishing its quantity with a view to restor-
ing the property of attention to its rightful owners. (Hotelling, 1938, 257) 
To sum up, the economics of attention seen as a ramification of in-
formation theory conveys two conflicting rationales for economic 
agents, depending on whether it focuses on the user or the provider 
of information: on one side we find economic and management mod-
els that analyze how it is possible for firms to capture the attention of 
customers or audiences in order to make money from it; on the other 
side there are analyses that focus on the overload of information from 
the viewpoint of consumers and provide solutions in order to protect 
the attention of users from information overload and pollution. 
Kessous, Mellet and Zouinar (2010) adopt an economic sociology per-
spective and interpret current innovations in the digital economy as 
attempts to reconcile customer relationship (CRM45) and vendor rela-
tionship (VRM46) management practices.  
The literature on attention economics belonging to the second ap-
proach borrows more explicitly from Simon, although, as we will de-
velop, it can be split into two strands, which corroborates the tradi-
tional dividing line between two distinct interpretations of Simon’s 
conception of bounded rationality: on one hand, the pars destruens, 
criticizing neoclassical view; on the other hand, the pars construens, 
consisting of an attempt to model behavior in a more realistic way (cf. 
Rizzello, 1999). According to the first interpretation, bounded ration-
ality is seen as a limitation to human rationality. By contrast, the se-
cond interpretation conceives bounded rationality as an adaptive ca-
pacity. This conception is endorsed by the stream of ‘ecological ra-
tionality’ (Smith, Nobel Lecture, 2002; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999) 
                                                            
45 CRM is a widely implemented model for managing a company’s interactions 
with customers, clients, and sales prospects. It involves using technology to or-
ganize, automate, and synchronize business processes—principally sales activi-
ties, but also those for marketing, customer service, and technical support. The 
overall goals are to find, attract, and win new clients; nurture and retain those the 
company already has; entice former clients back into the fold; and reduce the 
costs of marketing and client service.  
46 Attentiontrust is an example of VRM practices. It consists of a set of principles 
to govern the attention economy on the self-ownership of the data we create, and 
specialized software to regulate their use. Specifically, AttentionTrust believes 
that we all have the right 1) to own at least a copy of our data, 2) to store that data 
where we want and move it when we want, 3) to exchange it for something of 
value to us, and 4) to know what others intend to do with our data, so that we 
can make informed decisions about who should have access to it. 
(http://www.attentiontrust.org/blog). More generally, VRM is a category of 
business activity made possible by software tools that provide customers with 
both independence from vendors and better means for engaging with vendors 
and is conceived as the necessary complement of CRM. 
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according to which fast, information-economizing and frugal heuris-
tics based on salient rules can be efficient means of reasoning. In par-
ticular, the assumption that individuals neither look up nor integrate 
all information conveys a context-dependent conception of rationali-
ty. In a nutshell, rationality is contingent to the institutional environ-
ment and can only be measured in an evolutionary perspective.  
To be sure, the emerging macroeconomic literature on rational in-
attention we have hinted at in the introduction is clearly to be related 
to the first interpretation, which acknowledges that attention is lim-
ited, but restricts this limitation to a noise, which does not impair 
economic rationality. As emphasized by Sims (2003), the assumption 
of limited attention (or rational inattention) provides a microfounda-
tion for economic behavior that looks enough like the familiar ration-
al expectation assumption to ensure usefulness and tractability, even 
though the implications for policy are different enough to be interest-
ing (Sims 2003, 1). Similarly, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) show 
that assuming near-rational wage and price setting in macroeconomic 
modeling on the ground that experimental observations show that 
agents have some cognitive biases in macroeconomic does not impair 
the robustness of the results, and is consistent with some empirical 
findings. In the same vein, Falkinger (2008) develops a general equi-
librium model where agents are conceived as passive signal receivers 
characterized by limited attention and information providers are 
seeking to catch their attention by sending messages. The ability of 
agents to process an additional signal depends on the spared capacity 
left after the load imposed by exposure to other signals. Moreover, 
there exists a minimum (marginal) strength of a message in order for 
it to be perceived by the consumers. When total signal exposure lies 
below a certain level (this is the case of information-poor economies), 
there is no interference between different signals. Beyond this point 
(this is the case of information-rich economies) capacity limits lead to 
such interference. Falkinger concludes that information-rich econo-
mies reach an inefficient equilibrium –and therefore faces some wel-
fare losses– due to attention-seekers engaging in wasteful signalling 
in the competition for attention. But, to repeat it, in these kinds of 
models, the traditional assumption of economic rationality is pre-
served.  
The other strand of the literature consisting of a second series of 
theoretical developments focusing on selective attention and problem 
solving (see, e.g., Gabaix et al., 2003; Gabaix et al., 2006; Schwartz-
stein, 2010), by contrast, is more in line with the second interpretation 
of bounded rationality. These contributions provide models whose 
theoretical predictions are corroborated by some experiments. In par-
ticular, they show how selective attention may lead individuals to 
persistently fail to recognize important empirical regularities, make 
biased forecasts, and hold incorrect beliefs about the statistical rela-
| The ‘Economics of Attention’: A HET Perspective 27 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 5(1) : 3-36 
tionships between variables. This literature is linked to the notions of 
accessibility and salience put forward by Kahneman in his dual cog-
nitive system based on the distinction between intuition (system 1) 
and reasoning (system 2), where he defines accessibility as “the ease 
with which particular mental contents come to mind” (Higgins, 1996, 
quoted by Kahneman in his 2002 Nobel Lecture; Kahneman, 2003, 
1452) as well as to heuristics used as efficient means of solving prob-
lems that we can find in Gigerenzer and Todd (1999). Interesting 
work based on both theoretical modeling and experiments47 by Ga-
baix et al. (2005, 2006) supports the theoretical benchmark of partially 
myopic cognition due to limited but ‘efficient’ attention (what Gabaix 
and Laibson, 2005 call the ‘Directed Cognition model’) and the empir-
ical existence of some heuristics48.  
Whether this second strand of the literature can be considered as a 
kind of middle ground between standard and ecological rationality is 
a question of interpretation. But given the trade-off between tractabil-
ity and realism involved in theoretical modeling, this literature looks 
however very promising and reveals a more profound rupture with 
the classical conception of rationality in economics.  
But the problem does not limit itself to the question of rationality. 
Another classical drawback of information economics is that it is 
based on the mathematical theory of information introduced by 
Shannon (1948). One major drawback relates to the problem of the 
meaning of information, which, if it is not a concern in the mathemat-
ical theory of information, becomes of utmost importance when deal-
ing with attention. Whether we pay attention to somebody or some-
thing can reasonably be expected to depend on how the same infor-
mation is interpreted or perceived by different individuals or even by 
the same individual depending on the context49. Arrow (1974) already 
stressed that the same information can have very different value for 
different individuals. Boulding (1955) also emphasized that  
                                                            
47 The experimental design derives from previous work by Camerer et al. (1993), 
Camerer and Johnson (2004) and Costa-Gomes (2001). It uses the “Mouselab” 
programming language to measure subjects’ information acquisition. Information 
is hidden behind boxes on a computer screen and subjects have to use the com-
puter mouse to open (or close) the boxes in order to get (costly) information that 
helps solving a problem (of income maximization) in a given limited period of 
time. On the one hand, Mouselab records permit to know the order and duration 
of information acquisition. On the other hand, since one screen box can be open 
at any time, it is possible to know what information is acquired on a second-by-
second basis throughout the experiment. 
48 In particular, they show that subjects tend to become more and more likely to 
end an analysis of a problem the more boxes they open holding fixed the eco-
nomic benefit of additional analysis (what they call the ‘box heuristics’). 
49 See Garrouste and Langlois (1997) for an appraisal of the problem of interpre-
tation of information, and therefore, of its derived economic value, that econo-
mists have to take into account seriously. 
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we cannot regard knowledge as simply the accumulation of information 
in a stockpile, even though all messages that are received by the brain may 
leave some sort of deposit there. Knowledge must itself be regarded as a 
structure, a very complex and frequently quite loose pattern...with its 
parts connected in various ways by ties of varying degrees of strength. 
Messages are continually shot into this structure; some of them pass right 
through its interstices...without effecting any perceptible change in it. 
Sometimes messages ‘stick’ to the structure and become part of 
it....Occasionally, however, a message which is inconsistent with the basic 
pattern of the mental structure, but which is of a nature that it cannot be 
disbelieved hits the structure, which is then forced to undergo a complete 
reorganization” (Boulding, 1955, 103-104). 
This explains the fact that some scholars, mostly belonging to the 
Austrian tradition, stress the idea that information and knowledge 
are different concepts and that their differences are not reducible to 
the distinction between a flow and a stock, as it is the case in infor-
mation economics50. This conceptual assimilation of knowledge to 
information seems the reason why Hayek’s conception of attention is 
not developed by economics of attention. A related problem lies in 
the nature of information, which can be manifold in reality and there-
fore, cannot be always easily reducible to bits limited by a Shannon 
capacity constraint. As noticed by Sims (2006, 4), information can take 
the form of internal human information processing, of wiring media 
(telephone lines, internet connection, periodical subscription etc.) but 
also of costly investigation through interviews, surveys etc. If the two 
former kinds of information can be dealt with using a unitary and 
plastic concept of information, it is no more the case with the last 
form of information which involves discontinuities.  
5. Conclusion  
As far as our investigation suggests, it is not easy to circumvent the 
economic literature dealing with attention and to encompass the vari-
ous aspects of the notion of attention that may be useful for econo-
mists. 
In view of critics addressed to the information-based “economics 
of attention” and insights from the authors from the past whom we 
have considered, some interesting lines of research to be developed 
are worth pointing out. 
First, the comparison between Hayek and Polanyi’s respective 
conceptions of attention suggests that the relation between attention 
and intentionality is all but obvious and should be taken more seri-
ously by social scientists today. 
In addition, the fact that attention is a historical process and con-
text-dependent is an invitation to think more deeply about how to 
                                                            
50 See Boettke (2002). 
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handle and regulate the scarcity of attention in our societies. Such a 
global research question calls for an interdisciplinary approach in-
volving economists but also historians, philosophers, psychologists, 
sociologists, as well as management scientists. The ways to look at the 
economic issues raised by the scarcity of attention are manifold. One 
could be to revisit Foucault’s thought on political discourse and ‘gov-
ernmentality’. Another one could consist in wearing the eyeglasses of 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008)’s approach of ‘nudging’, a recent concept 
in economics which is linked with the idea that it is possible to coun-
tervail behavioral biases in a non-invasive way in order to enhance 
both individual and social welfare.  
We have emphasized some of the drawbacks and limits of the eco-
nomic approach of attention, pointing out in particular the risk of 
confining the economics of attention to a mere ramification of infor-
mation economics. 
No doubt that one of the greatest unmet scientific challenges of 
our societies is to provide an institutional framework that permits to 
sustain an appropriate balance between the interest of information 
providers and users. Obviously there is a lot of work to be done but 
some innovative research lines are currently being explored that en-
hance our understanding of the role that attention plays in various 
contexts of economic decision-making.  
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